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Determinants of Non-Performing Loans in Greece: the 
intricate role of fiscal expansion 
 




Following the financial and debt crises in the euro area and the delays in formulating a 
cohesive policy response, Greek banks faced serious problems with the increase in non-
performing loans (NPLs) being the most threatening. In this study, we attempt to empirically 
investigate the determinants of NPLs in the Greek banking sector, using quarterly aggregate 
data for the period 2003Q1-2020Q2 and the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds 
testing approach. We find that NPLs are determined mostly by factors related to 
macroeconomic conditions in Greece during the period under investigation, rather than by 
bank-related factors. Of particular interest is the case of government debt, which is found to 
exert a significant and positive long-term impact on NPLs irrespective of some short-term 
dynamics that appear to provide a temporary relief. The fiscal balance is also found to exert 
a negative long-term effect, justifying the quest for surpluses post-crisis. As debt 
accumulation is a policy followed by most countries in order to stabilize economies hit by 
the COVID-19 crisis, its long-term effects on the financial system should be taken into 
account and institutional measures introduced to face the new risk. 
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The ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans (NPL ratio) in Greece increased 
sharply during the global financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent sovereign debt 
crisis. As is shown in Fig. 1, the NPL ratio in Greece started increasing in the first 
quarter of 2009 (2009Q1), reaching a peak of 49.1% in 2016Q3. It started falling 
afterwards, arriving at 35.38% in 2020Q3, which can be compared to the euro area 
average of 3% in the same period. In absolute terms NPLs reached 58.7 bn euro in 
2020Q3 from their highest level of 107.2 bn in 2016Q1 and 68.5 bn at the end of 
2019 (Bank of Greece, 2021).  
 




The unprecedented high levels of NPLs in Greece place serious constraints on the 
lending capacity of banks (Louri and Migiakis, 2019), thereby significantly weakening 
investment and economic activity and placing the country at a disadvantage 
compared to other euro area members. As Hardouvelis (2021) notes in an extensive 
paper on the Greek banking sector, NPLs continue to be the critical problem of the 
Greek banking system and the Greek economy. Therefore, profound analysis and 
understanding of their determinants are essential in order to introduce measures 
leading to their effective control. 
In 2020 the COVID-19 pandemic drove the Greek economy into a deep recession and 
deflation and led to increases in fiscal deficit, uncertainty and credit risk. New NPLs 
have been added on the legacy assets already existing on banks’ balance sheets. It is 
expected that the COVID-related NPLs will reach 8-10 bn euro in 2021 (Bank of 
Greece, 2021). Due to the large contraction of GDP reaching 8.2% in 2020 vs. a 
contraction of 6.8% in the euro area fiscal support measures of more than 9% of GDP 
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have been undertaken to support businesses and employment. Fiscal measures of 
6.5% of GDP are planned to be adopted in 2021 (Bank of Greece, 2020). Such 
measures, although necessary for stabilizing the badly hit economy, will increase 
government debt and its servicing needs in the future potentially leading to tax 
increases or other second-round effects, which will be of a contractionary nature. 
How will NPLs be affected by expansionary measures in the short-run and in the 
long-run? This is the question we want to focus on in our study. If the long-run effect 
is positive, then drastic institutional measures, such as the creation of an asset 
management company or the introduction of new government guaranteed 
securitization schemes could be the major (if not the only) weapon to face the risk.  
As presented in detail in Section 2 of this study, the investigation of the 
determinants of NPLs in the Greek banking sector has been conducted by using 
different econometric methods and datasets over different time periods. The 
present study investigates the determinants of NPLs in Greece using quarterly 
aggregate data for the period 2003Q1-2020Q2 and the autoregressive distributed lag 
(ARDL) bounds testing approach. This approach proposed by Pesaran et al. (2001) 
facilitates the examination of a long-run relationship between variables that are 
purely I(0), purely I(1), or a mixture of both. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first attempt to use the above econometric method in order to investigate the 
determinants of NPLs in Greece and distinguish their short- and long-term effects. 
Furthermore, it is the first time that an empirical research on the Greek NPLs 
extends up to the 2020Q2, thus covering the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic 
in Greece. 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on NPLs 
and more generally on credit risk in Greece. Section 3 describes the data and the 
econometric model, while Section 4 presents the econometric methodology. Section 




2. Literature review 
 
After the global financial crisis and as NPLs had become the most serious problem of 
many banks and banking systems, numerous studies were published attempting to 
understand the determinants and the dynamics of the phenomenon. The general 
empirical approach is that NPLs are determined by two groups of factors: country-
related and bank-related. In particular, macroeconomic conditions, such as GDP 
growth (Anastasiou et al., 2016; Jimenez and Saurina, 2006), unemployment (Louzis 
et al., 2012; Rinaldi and Sanchis-Arellano, 2006), interest rates (Espinoza and Prasad, 
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2010; Louzis et al., 2012), inflation/deflation (Ghosh, 2015; Nkusu, 2011; 
Vithessonthi, 2016), exchange rates (Beck et al., 2015; Klein, 2013) as well as 
external deficits being a sign of competitiveness loss (Kauko, 2012) have been found 
to be major determinants of NPLs. Factors related to the functioning of the banking 
sector, such as the degree of competition and the level of concentration have also 
been estimated in cross-country studies to affect risk taking and NPLs (Anginer et al, 
2014; Kick and Prieto, 2015; Karadima and Louri, 2020). Other bank-related 
characteristics representing the quality of management, such as cost efficiency 
(Podpiera and Weill, 2008; Koju et al., 2018), bank performance (Anastasiou et al., 
2019b; Louzis et al., 2012; Makri et al., 2014) and bank capitalization (Ghosh, 2015; 
Koju et al., 2018) have also been documented to influence NPLs. In this section we 
present in a more detailed way only studies referring to NPLs in Greece as most of 
them have not been presented in a comprehensive, country-specific framework until 
now. 
There are empirical studies that proceed to a breakdown of total loans into the main 
three categories: consumer, mortgage, and business loans. Louzis et al. (2012) 
examine the macro and bank-specific determinants of NPLs in the Greek banking 
sector, separately for consumer loans, mortgage loans, and business loans. Using 
panel data for the nine (9) largest Greek banks over the period 2003Q1-2009Q3, 
they find that the GDP growth rate, the unemployment rate, the lending rates and 
the public debt exert a strong impact on NPLs. They also show that bank-specific 
variables that are related to the quality of management (specifically, cost efficiency 
and performance) are among the determinants of NPLs in Greece. Eventually, the 
results indicate that the quantitative effects of the various NPL determinants depend 
on the category of loans, with mortgages being the least affected by macroeconomic 
developments. Using a quasi-AIM (aggregating individual markets – AIM) approach 
on a panel of supervisory data from the nine (9) largest banks in Greece over the 
period 2003Q1-2009Q3, and distinguishing between consumer, mortgage and 
business loans, Vouldis and Louzis (2018) find that specific market variables 
(supermarket sales, confidence indices for the services and construction sector, and 
the business sentiment index) are good predictors for future NPLs. In addition, bank-
level variables related to performance (inefficiency, ROA and ROE) represent top-
performing leading indicators for business NPLs. Finally, industrial production and 
imports are the optimal predictors for consumer and business NPLs, respectively. In 
the same vein, Charalambakis et al. (2017) investigate the determinants of NPLs in 
Greece over the period 2005Q1-2015Q4 using aggregate data on consumer, 
mortgage and business loans. Using a SUR (seeming unrelated regressions) 
framework, suitably extended to allow for a common structural break in the 
relationship between NPLs and their determinants, they show that unemployment 
and inflation have been the key determinants of NPLs in the Greek banking sector, 
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with their effects becoming stronger after the intensification of the recession and 
the political uncertainty in the first quarter of 2012. 
In some other empirical studies, the research is based on individual loans. Using a 
dataset of corporate loans of 13070 Greek firms over the period 2008-2015, 
Asimakopoulos et al. (2016) find that one out of six firms with NPLs are strategic 
defaulters. They also note that the outstanding debt and the economic uncertainty 
are positively related to strategic default, while a negative relationship is 
documented between strategic default and the value of collaterals. Strategic default 
is also found to be more likely among medium-sized and middle-aged firms. Based 
on an extension of the discrete-time survival analysis model that allows for an 
endogenously estimated structural break in its baseline hazard function, Dendramis 
et al. (2018) model the probability of default of 79016 Greek individual mortgage 
loans with monthly frequency from January 2008 to October 2014. They show that 
political instability, economic recession and distressed financial conditions constitute 
the key factors for mortgage loan default. They also find that banning foreclosure 
laws on mortgage loans increase their probability of default by raising the moral 
hazard incentives that borrowers will not pay back their loans. Also, restructured or 
refinanced mortgage loans are found to positively affect future default probabilities. 
Finally, they provide evidence that the probability of default depends on loan-
specific variables, such as the ratio of the total balance of a loan to its most recent 
collateral valuation and the ratio of the delinquent amount of a loan to its contract 
amount, as well as on macroeconomic variables, such as the unemployment rate and 
the inflation rate. Using a binomial logistic regression approach, Giannopoulos 
(2018) investigates the causes of NPLs in Greece by studying the status of a sample 
of 2591 loans granted to micro and small enterprises in order to cover their working 
capital needs. The loans were granted in 2005 and changes in their status are 
followed between December 2010 and December 2011. He finds that the age of the 
business’s owner, the business loan to turnover ratio and the borrower’s 
misbehavior before granting the loan have a positive impact on NPLs. In contrast, 
factors that indicate a higher wealth state of borrowers (e.g. existence of sufficient 
property free of liabilities), stronger collaterals and more years of business operation 
have a negative relationship with NPLs. Focusing on the probability of default of 
consumer loans Dendramis et al (2020) employ the skewed logit distribution as an 
asymmetric binary link function. They model the probability of default of 55805 
Greek individual consumer loans with monthly frequency from April 2009 to 
December 2015. The skewed logit distribution considerably improves the ability of 
the underlying survival analysis model to predict the probability of default of 
consumer loans, especially under distressed financial conditions, compared to the 
logit and cloglog distributions. The results show that the ratio of the delinquent 
amount of a consumer loan over its balance constitutes a key indicator of loan 
default prediction, while the ratios of the installment and the actual payments of a 
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loan over the personal income of the borrower reduce the probability of default, 
thus suggesting that the payment rates of consumer loans could increase if loan 
installments were adjusted to borrowers’ income. In contrast, the total predictive 
power of macroeconomic covariates (GDP growth rate, unemployment rate and 
inflation rate) on the probability of loan default is small. 
A group of studies examine the dynamic behavior of NPLs and other economic 
variables using a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) and a Vector Error Correction (VEC) 
approach. Konstantakis et al. (2016) investigate the determinants of NPLs in the 
Greek banking sector over the period 2001Q4-2015Q1. Using aggregate data and 
following a VAR/VEC approach, they find that the public debt exerts a strong positive 
impact on NPLs, indicating that fiscal problems in Greece are related to the increase 
of NPLs. They also find that rising NPLs are transmitted to the Greek economy 
through increases in unemployment. A VAR/VEC approach is also used by 
Monokroussos et al. (2016) to investigate the determinants of NPLs in Greece over 
the period 2005Q1-2015Q4. They find that a slowdown in economic activity and a 
rise in unemployment increase NPLs. They also consider that the primary cause of 
the sharp increase of NPLs in Greece after the outbreak of the 2008 crisis can 
primarily be explained by the huge decline in economic activity and the sharp rise in 
unemployment rather than by the rapid credit expansion experienced in Greece 
after the adoption of the euro. The degree of correlation of NPLs among the four 
systemic banks in Greece (National Bank of Greece, Alpha Bank, Piraeus Bank and 
Eurobank) over the period 2005-2016 is examined by Toudas et al. (2017). By 
employing a VAR/VEC approach, they find that the level of NPLs of each bank is 
affected not only by the performance of the bank itself in previous periods, but also 
by the performance of the other banks during the same periods. Furthermore, by 
examining the impulse response of a positive shock on the level of NPLs of each bank 
they expose the existence of correlations between the four banks. 
Except for the NPL ratio alternative proxies for credit risk are also used in the 
empirical literature on the Greek banking system. Makri (2015) examines the effect 
of various accounting and macroeconomics indices on credit risk, proxied 
alternatively by the loans loss provisions (LLP) and loans loss reserves (LLR) ratios. 
Using two different datasets, the first containing individual bank level annual data 
over the period 2000-2011 and the latter containing aggregate quarterly data from 
2001Q1 to 2012Q4, the study shows that unemployment, public debt and inflation 
exert a positive effect on credit risk, while the growth rate of GDP exerts a negative 
effect. In addition, higher levels of capital ratios, liquidity and profitability are found 
to improve the quality of the loan portfolio of banks.  
Moreover, the quality of governance has been introduced in the empirical literature 
to assess its impact on NPLs. Anastasiou et al. (2019a) construct a new governance 
index by obtaining the common factor that describes the joint variation of the six 
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Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) for Greece by conducting a principal 
component analysis (PCA). Using annual data for the period 1996-2016, they find 
that the new governance index has a statistically significant impact on NPLs. 
Inefficient governance as well as systemic liquidity risk have been found to increase 
NPLs.  
Finally, the role of post-crisis changes in regulation in Greece has been discussed by 
Karafolas and Ktenidou (2019) who stress the role of over-indebtedness and the 
need for legal protection of businesses and households. A new bankruptcy law, as 
well as encouragement of out-of-court settlements have been rather ineffective 
initiatives in containing NPLs given the size of the economic recession.  
 
3. Data and econometric model 
3.1 Data description 
We employ a dataset containing aggregated quarterly data for the period 2003Q1-
2020Q2. Data have been obtained from the Bank of Greece, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS) and Eurostat. 
 
3.2 Econometric model 
 
Our analysis is based on the following baseline regression model: 
𝑦! = 𝛼" +%𝛼#
$
#%&
𝑥# + 𝜖! (1) 
 
where yt is the dependent variable, xκ (κ=1,2,..,Κ) is a set of K macroeconomic or 
bank-related independent variables, and εt is the error term. 
 
3.3 Regression variables 
 
The dependent variable is the growth rate of the NPL ratio (NPL), which is often used 
in the literature as a proxy for credit risk.  
The country-related factors taken into account in our estimations are the following: 
The real GDP growth rate (GDP) shows the fluctuations in economic activity. During 
economic recessions, borrowers’ incomes decrease hindering their ability to service 
their debt. The negative relationship between the GDP growth and the NPL ratio has 
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been documented in the literature (Beck et al., 2015; De Bock and Demyanets, 2012; 
Jakubik and Reininger, 2014; Jimenez and Saurina, 2006; Karadima and Louri, 2021). 
Most researchers agree that it is the most important factor in determining NPLs. 
The growth rate of the public (government) debt as percent of GDP (PublicDebt) is 
used in the literature as a proxy for a country’s solvency risk. Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2010) note that the “sovereign ceiling”, in which corporate borrowers are rated no 
higher than their national governments, places a threshold on the rating of a 
country’s banks, making their offshore borrowing very costly or impossible. Under 
the pressure of reduced liquidity, banks may have to cut lending and thus borrowers 
cannot refinance their debts (Ghosh, 2015; Islamoglu, 2015). In addition, a high 
public debt may necessitate the need for fiscal measures, which as Gosh (2015) 
notes, may have a direct or indirect negative impact on borrowers’ income and lead 
to a subsequent rise in NPLs. A positive impact of the public debt to GDP ratio on 
NPLs has also been reported by Ari et al. (2019), Koju et al. (2018), Louzis et al. 
(2012), and Vogiazas and Nikolaidou (2011).  
The inverse of the employment expectations indicator (EEI), compiled by the 
Eurostat, is used to take into account unemployment uncertainty (Unemployment). 
As it has been supported by empirical studies (Dua and Smyth, 1993; Tortorice, 
2012), people usually expect higher unemployment rates than those that are actually 
experienced in the future. It is the fear about future unemployment that may lead 
borrowers to postpone their loan payments. Also, if unemployment fears 
materialize, borrowers will be unable to service their debts and, hence, meet their 
debt obligations. 
The fiscal balance (government budget balance) as percent of GDP (FiscalBalance) is 
used as a measure of a government’s ability to meet its financing needs. Anastasiou 
et al. (2019b) find that fiscal deficits have a significantly positive impact on NPLs in 
the euro-area periphery countries during the period 1990Q1-2015Q2, implying a 
positive feedback between expansive fiscal policies and NPLs. 
The quarterly growth rate of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) is used a proxy for the 
inflation rate (Inflation). According to Klein (2013), the impact of inflation on NPLs 
may be ambiguous, since higher inflation reduces both the real value of outstanding 
loans and the borrowers’ real income. Under these conditions, loan servicing would 
be easier for borrowers, unless their wages remained sticky. 
As for bank-related factors the following variables are used: 
The growth rate of bank credit (provided to non-financial corporations) as percent of 
GDP (BankCredit) is used as a proxy for financial development. An increase in bank 
credit generally indicates a sound process of financial development. However, an 
excessive loan growth is often coupled with lower lending standards and collateral 
requirements, a practice that results in loan losses during economic downturns. 
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Borio and Lowe (2002a) argue that sustained rapid credit growth, combined with 
large increases in asset prices, appears to increase financial instability, while Jimenez 
and Saurina (2006) find that rapid credit growth results in lower credit standards 
eventually leading to higher NPLs. Kohler (2012) finds that banks become more risky 
if aggregate credit growth is excessive, whereas Aikman et al. (2015) note that a 
lesson of both past financial crises and the most recent global financial crisis is that 
credit booms sow the seeds of subsequent credit crunches. In the same vein, 
Cotugno et al. (2010), and Jakubik and Reininger (2014) find a positive impact of the 
bank credit to GDP ratio on NPLs. 
To take into account possible long-term changes of the credit-to-GDP ratio, for 
example due to financial deepening (Drehmann et al., 2010), we also use the growth 
rate of the credit-to-GDP gap (CreditGap) as an alternative measure of credit growth. 
The credit-to-GDP gap, defined as the deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio from its 
long-term trend, was first introduced by Borio and Lowe (2002b). They argue that 
when the credit-to-GDP ratio is sufficiently above its long-term trend financial 
imbalances emerge, which signal the risk of future distress. 
 The ratio of net loans to total assets (Loans_to_Assets) indicates the specialization 
of banks in providing loans. Brei et al. (2018) find that banks that are more involved 
in lending report relatively more NPLs, while Klein (2013) finds that the loans-to-
assets ratio, considered as a proxy for excessive lending, leads to higher NPLs. A 
positive impact of the loan-to-asset ratio on NPLs has also been documented in 
Ekanayake and Azeez (2015), Khemraj and Pasha (2009), and Sinkey and Greenwalt 
(1991). 
The growth rate of the 3-month interbank rate (InterbankRate) approximates the 
stance of monetary policy. Using 18000 annual observations on euro area banks over 
the period 2001-2008, Delis and Kouretas (2011) discover a strong negative 
relationship between interest rates and bank risk-taking. This finding holds for both 
short-term interest rate, proxied by the annual average of the 3-month interbank 
rate, and other types of interest rates (long-term, industry and bank-level). As the 
authors note, banks appear to have increased their risk-taking appetite substantially 
during the low interest rates period under study. Based on the detailed answers of 
the confidential Bank Lending Survey (BLS) for the euro area countries over the 
period 2002Q4-2008Q3 and of the Senior Loan Officer (SLO) survey for the U.S. over 
the period 1991Q2-2008Q3, Maddaloni and Peydro (2011) find that low (monetary 
policy) short-term interest rates soften the lending standards for household and 
corporate loans. 
The growth rate of the interest rate spread (InterestRateSpread), which is the spread 
between loan and deposit rates, quantifies the efficiency of financial intermediation. 
As Agapova and McNulty(2016) note, low interest rate spreads are indicative of a 
more efficient financial system. Higher interest rate spreads increase the cost of 
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loans charged on borrowers, so a positive impact of the growth of interest rate 
spreads on NPLs is expected (Espinoza and Prasad, 2010).  
We allocate the above variables into four groups (see Table 1) in order to investigate 
the existence of a long-run relationship between the members of each group. Each 
variable may participate in more than one group, while the dependent variable NPL 
is a member of all four groups.  
 
 Table 1. Groups of variables 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
NPL NPL NPL NPL 
GDP GDP GDP  GDP  
PublicDebt PublicDebt FiscalBalance FiscalBalance 
Unemployment Unemployment CreditGap Inflation 
BankCredit Loans_ to_ Assets Inflation InterbankRate 
   InterestRateSpread 
    
 
4. Econometric methodology 
4.1 Selection of econometric methodology 
In this study, we investigate empirically the long-run equilibrium relationship 
between the dependent variable (NPL) and each of the sets of independent variables 
belonging to the groups presented in Table 1. This kind of analysis is usually based on 
the use of cointegration techniques, the most widely employed of which are those of 
Engle and Granger (1987), and Johansen (1991, 1992, 1995). However, these 
methods can be applied only in cases where all the underlying variables are 
integrated of order one. Therefore, none of the aforementioned techniques could be 
used in the context of our study, which is based on a mixture of both I(1) and I(0) 
variables, i.e. integrated of order one and zero, respectively. As a consequence, we 
decided to use a bounds testing approach, within the autoregressive distributed lag 
(ARDL) framework proposed by Pesaran et al. (2001). This methodology can be 
applied irrespective of whether the underlying variables are I(1), I(0), or a mixture of 
both. Because of this, the concept of long-run relationship established in this 
framework is much broader than that of cointegration. 
In the context of the ARDL bounds testing approach, we express Equation (1) in the 
following unrestricted error correction (EC) model. 
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where Δ is the difference operator and ut is the error term. 
The coefficients attached to the differenced variables represent the short-run 
effects, while the values of the coefficients γk, after being divided by -γy, represent 
the long-run effects. The superscripts p and qk (k=1,2,...,K) on the summation 
symbols in Equation (2) denote number of lags, which are optimally selected using 
one or more information criteria (BIC, AIC, etc.). 
The proposed tests by Pesaran et al. (2001) are based on the standard F- and t-
statistics. First, the F-statistic is used to test the null hypothesis (H0) that the values 
of the coefficients γy and γk (k=1,2,…,K) are jointly zero (i.e. γy=γ1=γ2=…=γK=0), 
suggesting the absence of a long-run relationship, against the alternative hypothesis 
(H1) that at least one of these coefficients differs from zero. However, as Narayan 
(2005) notes, the F-statistic has a non-standard distribution, which depends upon (a) 
whether the variables are I(0) or I(1), (b) the number of regressors, (c) whether the 
model includes an intercept and/or trend, and (d) the sample size.  
For this reason, Pesaran et al. (2001) provide two sets of critical values for the F-
statistic, one that assumes that all variables are I(0) and another one that assumes 
that all variables are I(1). The critical values for the I(0) and the I(1) variables are 
considered as the lower bound and the upper bound critical values, respectively. If 
the F-statistic falls below the lower bound, the H0 hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
Hence, we conclude that the variables cannot be in a long-run relationship. If the F-
statistic falls between the two bounds, the bounds F-test is inconclusive. Finally, if 
the F-statistic exceeds the upper bound, then the H0 hypothesis is rejected.  
However, the rejection of the null hypothesis (H0) solely cannot guarantee the 
existence of long-run relationship, since the alternative hypothesis H1 permits two 
cases, referred by Pesaran et al. (2001) as “degenerate level relationships”, which 
imply no long-run relationship between the dependent variable and the independent 
variables. 
(a) γy=0, but at least one of γ1, γ2, …, γK is different from zero. 
(b) γy≠0, but γ1=γ2=…=γK=0. 
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To rule out the degenerate case (a), we use the t-statistic to test the null hypothesis 
of a zero coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (H0:γy=0 against H1:γy<0). As in 
the case of the F-statistic, Pesaran et al. (2001) provide two sets of critical values for 
the t-statistic, one that assumes that all variables are I(0) and another that assumes 
that all variables are I(1). The lower critical value bound is obtained when all 
variables are purely I(0), while the upper critical values bound is obtained when all 
variables are purely I(1). If the t-statistic falls below its lower bound, we cannot 
reject H0. If the t-statistic falls between its upper and lower bound, the bounds t-test 
is inconclusive. Finally, if the t-statistic exceeds its upper bound, we can conclude 
that the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is statistically different from 
zero, thus providing evidence that the degenerate case (a) can be ruled out. 
The ruling out of the degenerate case (b) can be checked by conducting conventional 
Wald tests in order to test the null hypothesis (H0) that the long-run coefficients of 
the independent variables (i.e. θ1=-γ1/γy, θ2=-γ2/γy,…,θΚ=-γΚ/γy) are jointly zero. The 
use of θi (i=1,2,…,K) in this test constitutes a practical advantage over tests directly 
based on the coefficients γi (i=1,2,…,K) of Equation (2), since the latter have non-
standard distributions (Kripfganz and Schneider, 2020). 
To summarize, we can conclude that there is a long-run relationship between the 
dependent and the independent variables if and only if all the above three tests 
reject their respective null hypotheses (H0). It should also be noted that if the 
dependent variable were I(1) then there could be at most one cointegrating 
relationship involving the dependent variable (Pesaran et al., 2001). 
 
4.2 Implementation of the selected econometric methodology 
 
First, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit-root tests showed that none of our 
variables had an order beyond unity. More specifically, the variables 
Loans_to_Assets and Inflation were found to be I(1), while the other variables were 
found to be I(0). 
Second, all the regressions were performed using the ardl.ado program, developed 
in Stata by Kripfganz and Schneider (2018). The results are presented in Table 2. 
Models 1-4 correspond to the groups of variables 1-4 (see Table 1) respectively. The 
optimal number of lags for each variable and per model among all possible 
combinations of up to a maximum of 6 lags was selected using the Bayesian 
information criterion (BIC). 
Regarding the bounds test, the ardl.ado program uses the critical values that have 
been computed by Kripfganz and Schneider (2020) who use response surface 
regressions to obtain finite-sample and asymptotic critical values, which allow for 
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any number of long-forcing variables. These critical values fit well to our small-size 
sample as the critical values provided by Pesaran et al. (2001) have been generated 
for large samples. Following the results of the bounds test as presented in Table A3 
in the Appendix, the values of the F-statistic and the t-statistic across all models 
indicate a long-run relationship between the dependent variable NPL and the 
independent variables included in each model.  
The results of the Wald tests, which were conducted to check the degenerate case 
(b) in Section 4.1, are presented in Table A4 in the Appendix. Based on the results of 
all three tests (i.e. the F-bounds test, the t-bounds test, and the Wald test) we can 
definitely conclude that there exists a long-run relationship between the dependent 
variable NPL and the independent variables across all models 1-4.  
We also conducted a set of post-estimation checks in order to assess the validity of 
our regression results: the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroscedasticity, the Breusch-Godfrey LM test and the Durbin’s alternative test for 
autocorrelation, the skewness/kurtosis test and the Shapiro-Wilk W test for 
normality, the Ramsey RESET (Regression Specification-Error Test) for omitted 
variables, and the cumulative sum (CUSUM) test for parameter stability. The results 
of these tests are presented in Table A4 in the Appendix. 
 
Table 2. NPL regression models  
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Adjustment to equilibrium     
     
NPL(-1) -0.688*** -0.657*** -0.512*** -0.535*** 
 (0.105) (0.107) (0.080) (0.078) 
     
Long-run relationship     
     
GDP (-1) -1.965*** -1.809*** -3.355*** -3.347*** 
 (0.601) (0.642) (0.620) (0.575) 
PublicDebt (-1) 0.916*** 0.905**   
 (0.333) (0.361)   
Unemployment (-1) 0.178** 0.181**   
 (0.078) (0.084)   
FiscalBalance (-1)   -0.338** -0.308** 
   (0.163) (0.152) 
Inflation (-1)   0.528 0.122 
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VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
   (1.670) (1.561) 
BankCredit (-1) 0.042    
 (0.268)    
CreditGap (-1)   0.012  
   (0.010)  
Loans_to_Assets (-1)  0.063   
  (0.124)   
InterbankRate (-1)    -0.027* 
    (0.014) 
InterestRateSpread (-1)    0.242* 
    (0.129) 
     
Short-run relationship     
     
ΔGDP -0.261 -0.011 -0.325* -0.268 
 (0.239) (0.212) (0.170) (0.166) 
ΔPublicDebt 0.062 0.097   
 (0.130) (0.133)   
ΔPublicDebt (-1) -0.338*** -0.313**   
 (0.119) (0.122)   
ΔUnemployment 0.140 0.139   
 (0.087) (0.090)   
ΔUnemployment (-1) 0.314*** 0.292***   
 (0.087) (0.090)   
ΔFiscalBalance   0.212** 0.196** 
   (0.094) (0.091) 
ΔInflation   -1.591** -1.414** 
   (0.647) (0.626) 
ΔInflation (-1)   -0.577 -0.141 
   (0.987) (0.999) 
ΔInflation (-2)   -0.840 -0.051 
   (0.879) (0.928) 
ΔInflation (-3)   -3.532*** -3.153*** 
   (0.814) (0.793) 
ΔInflation (-4)   -1.661** -1.345* 
   (0.715) (0.708) 
ΔBankCredit -0.611*    
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VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 (0.310)    
ΔCreditGap   0.006  
   (0.005)  
ΔLoans_to_Assets  0.041   
  (0.082)   
ΔInterbankRate    -0.015* 
    (0.007) 
ΔInterestRateSpread    0.129* 
    (0.067) 
     
Constant 9.683 6.568 -0.754 -1.628 
 (6.551) (8.185) (2.359) (2.321) 
     
Observations 64 64 64 64 
R-squared 0.761 0.740 0.781 0.798 
Adj. R-squared 0.692 0.672 0.712 0.729 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: ΔNPL. The symbols *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Δ is 
the first difference operator, while (-n) represents the n-th lag (n=1,2,3,4). 
 
5. Empirical results 
The results of the econometric estimation of our regression models are presented in 
Table 2. We first go through the results regarding the long-run relationship between 
the variables under examination and then we comment on their short-run dynamics. 
The most reliable determinants of NPLs are related to macroeconomic developments 
(growth, public debt, fiscal balance, unemployment uncertainty). Some bank-related 
variables play a less significant role.  
 
 
5.1 Adjustment to equilibrium 
As it is shown in Table 2, the coefficient of adjustment (provided by the opposite of 
the coefficient of the first lag of the dependent variable) is positive as it should be in 
order to have convergence towards the long-run equilibrium after a shock. The 
coefficient of adjustment denotes how much of the adjustment to equilibrium takes 
16 
 
place in each period. For example, the coefficient of adjustment in Model 1 is equal 
to -(-0.688)=0.688, which denotes that 68.8% of the adjustment takes place each 
quarter. 
 
5.2 Long-run effects 
As expected, the real GDP growth (GDP) exerts a statistically significant and negative 
impact on NPLs across all models 1-4. As has already been supported by other 
researchers economic growth usually translates into higher income, which improves 
the financial capacity of borrowers. 
The coefficient of the public debt growth rate (PublicDebt) is positive and statistically 
significant (Models 1-2). The sharp and continuing increase of the Greek public debt 
after the first quarter of 2009 fueled fears about sovereign solvency and about the 
need to introduce austerity measures aiming at improving debt sustainability. Such 
fears make people and enterprises insecure and willing to postpone or even cancel 
their loan repayments. They also create financing difficulties for banks, which cannot 
roll over existing loans to enterprises. Debt servicing comes to a standstill and NPLs 
increase. 
The uncertainty about future unemployment (Unemployment) exerts a positive and 
statistically significant impact on NPLs (Models 1-2). It is the fear about future 
unemployment that makes debtors likely to delay their loan payments or even to 
suspend them completely. 
The coefficient of fiscal balance (FiscalBalance) is negative and statistically significant 
(Models 3-4). A fiscal surplus may give the opportunity to the government to 
increase the public spending and investment, stimulating the economic activity and 
leading to a subsequent reduction of NPLs. In contrast, a fiscal deficit may force the 
government to take austerity measures that would have an adverse impact on 
households and firms’ income, thus increasing NPLs. Fiscal balance remained steadily 
negative (i.e. in deficit) from the starting period of our study (2003Q1) until 2016Q1, 
ranging between -30,7% and -8% with an average value of -8.7%.  
The coefficient of the last macroeconomic variable used (Inflation) is positive but not 
statistically significant (Models 3-4). As has been suggested in other studies (Us, 
2017, 2018) rising prices in the long-term reduce the available income of borrowers 
and may make the repayment of their loans more difficult. Hence, commitment to 
price stability is important for containing NPLs and, subsequently, promoting 
financial stability. In our case, though, it was not found to exert a significant long-
term effect on NPLs. 
The coefficients of the three bank-specific variables although they had the expected 
positive signs were not found to be significant. The growth rate of bank credit 
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(BankCredit) was found to have a positive sign (Model 1). As explained in the 
literature an increase in bank credit generally indicates a sound process of financial 
development. However, an excessive loan growth is often coupled with lower 
lending standards and collateral requirements, a practice that pops up as loan losses 
during economic downturns. Bank credit in Greece exceeded 100% of GDP in 
2008Q3, reaching a peak of 119% in 2012Q2. A similar positive sign was obtained for 
the growth rate of credit gap (CreditGap) in Model 3, suggesting that any deviations 
of the credit-to-GDP ratio from its long-term trend were not so big as to have a 
significant impact on NPLs in the long run. Finally, the coefficient of the loans to 
assets ratio (Loans_to_Assets) in Model 2 was positive indicating that banks with 
high loans to assets ratios incur higher levels of NPLs due to selecting riskier projects 
as they increase the number of loans. Still, all three estimated coefficients 
corresponding to bank-related characteristics were not statistically significant. 
Finally, the last two variables taking into account the variability of interest rates were 
found to exert statistically significant long-term effects on NPL growth. The 
coefficient of the interbank rate (InterbankRate) is negative and significant at the 
10% significance level (Model 4), suggesting that an increase in interbank rates may 
lead banks with surplus money to invest in the interbank money market rather than 
provide risky loans. Conversely, declining interbank rates may make them so 
attractive to banks with a high risk profile as to lead them to borrow funds in the 
interbank market and invest them in riskier loans. The coefficient of the interest rate 
spread (InterestRateSpread) is positive and statistically significant at the 10% 
significance level (Model 4), indicating that higher spreads between deposit and loan 
rates increase the cost to borrowers and, thus, lead to higher growth of NPLs. 
 
5.3 Short-run effects 
The coefficient of the variable ΔGDP is negative across all models 1-4, but statistically 
significant (at the 10% level) only in Model 3. These findings suggest that a shock to 
the rate of change of the economic activity does not have a significant 
contemporaneous impact on NPLs.  
The coefficient of the variable ΔPublicDebt(-1), representing the one-period delayed 
effect of an increase in public debt, is statistically significant and negative in Models 
1 and 2. An increase in public debt, directed towards public spending, can promote 
lending activity and lead to a temporary decrease of NPL ratios through the 
denominator effect. The fact that the public debt does not affect NPLs 
contemporaneously (the coefficient of the variable ΔPublicDebt is not statistically 
significant and positive) indicates that capital flows may need some time to be 
directed to the real economy.  
18 
 
 A statistically significant and positive one-period delayed effect on NPLs is noticed in 
the case of unemployment uncertainty (ΔUnemployment (-1)) in Models 1 and 2, 
while unemployment uncertainty does not appear to significantly affect NPLs 
contemporaneously. These findings suggest that the effects of changes in the 
uncertainty about future unemployment may take some time to materialize in the 
form of failures in loan repayments. 
The coefficient of fiscal balance (FiscalBalance) is positive and statistically significant 
across both Models 3 and 4. An improvement in fiscal balance, stemming from 
increased tax collections in a specific quarter or a reduction in public spending, may 
lead some borrowers to postpone their loan payments. 
Some noteworthy effects of inflation on NPLs, either being contemporaneous or 
coming from three and four quarters back, are indicated by the negative and 
statistically significant coefficients of the variables ΔInflation, ΔInflation(-3) and 
ΔInflation(-4), respectively. We assume that the contemporaneous effect is coming 
from the banks’ side, since an increase in the inflation rate drives down their real 
rate of return and may lead them to temporarily reduce lending and even introduce 
stricter lending standards. The delayed effect might come from the borrowers’ side, 
since the reduction in the real value of loan installments may make their payments 
easier at least for a while.  
Regarding the bank-related determinants, the coefficient of bank credit (BankCredit) 
in Model 1 is statistically significant and negative, indicating that in the short-run an 
increase in bank credit reduces the NPL ratio. This short-run reaction of the NPL ratio 
can be attributed to the denominator effect. In contrast, the negative coefficient of 
the credit gap (CreditGap) is not statistically significant, indicating that any deviations 
of the credit-to-GDP ratio from its long-term trend were not found to have a 
significant short-run impact on NPLs. Finally, the short-run coefficient of the 
Loans_to_Assets variable is estimated to be positive but not statistically significant, 
suggesting that the specialization of banks in providing loans cannot be considered 
as a factor that played a major role in increasing NPLs. 
Lastly, the short-term effects of the interbank rate (InterbankRate) were found to be 
negative and statistically significant at the 10% significance level (Model 4) as in the 
long-term estimations. The explanation is similar, i.e. an increase in interbank rates 
may lead banks with surplus funds to invest in the interbank money market rather 
than provide risky loans. Likewise, the coefficient of the interest rate spread 
(InterestRateSpread) is positive and statistically significant at the 10% significance 
level (Model 4) as in the long-term estimations. Higher spreads between deposit and 
loan rates increase the cost to borrowers and make the servicing of loans more 





6.  Conclusions 
Following the financial and debt crises in the euro area and the delays in formulating 
a cohesive policy response, banks in Greece faced serious problems with the 
increase in non-performing loans (NPLs) being the most threatening and the most 
serious among euro area economies.  
In this study, we attempted to empirically investigate the determinants of NPLs in 
the Greek banking sector, using quarterly aggregate data for the period 2003Q1-
2020Q2 and the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach. We 
found that NPLs are determined mostly by factors related to macroeconomic 
conditions in Greece (GDP growth, public debt, fiscal balance and unemployment 
uncertainty) during the period under investigation, rather than by bank-related 
factors. Only the interbank interest rate and the spreads between deposit and loan 
rates as set by banks were found to affect NPLs significantly.  
Of particular interest is the case of government debt, which is found to exert a 
significant and positive long-term impact on NPLs irrespective of some short-term 
dynamics that appear to provide a temporary relief. The fiscal balance is also found 
to exert a negative long-term effect, justifying the quest for surpluses post-crisis. As 
debt accumulation is a policy followed by most countries in order to stabilize 
economies hit by the COVID-19 crisis, its long-term effects on the financial system 
and, more specifically, on NPLs should be taken into account. In the Greek case 
drastic institutional measures, such as the creation of an asset management 
company or the introduction of new government guaranteed securitization schemes 
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Table A1: Summary statistics  
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
 NPL 70 2.400 6.794 -12.690 18.957 
 GDP 70 -0.372 2.345 -14.148 3.258 
 PublicDebt 70 0.897 3.519 -19.582 9.827 
 Unemployment 70 -99.449 10.385 -116.200 -75.100 
 FiscalBalance 70 -6.629 6.313 -30.700 5.700 
 Inflation 70 0.373 1.393 -2.070 3.550 
 BankCredit 70 0.633 2.266 -5.379 4.762 
 CreditGap 70 3.299 75.698 -300.000 525.00 
 Loans to Assets 70 65.584 5.044 53.487 74.209 
 InterbankRate 70 4.820 54.536 -114.130 327.692 




Table A2: Correlation Matrix  























NPL 1.000            
GDP -0.279 1.000           
PublicDebt 0.195 -0.368 1.000          
Unemployment  0.707 -0.383 0.195 1.000         
FiscalBalance -0.408 0.260 -0.296 -0.368 1.000        
Inflation -0.101 0.054 0.190 -0.008 -0.247 1.000      - 
BankCredit 0.023 -0.154 0.110 0.005 -0.444 0.333 1.000      
CreditGap -0.070 0.072 -0.100 -0.032 0.102 -0.127 -0.065 1.000     
Loans_to_Assets 0.267 0.066 0.064 0.150 -0.375 0.288 0.618 -0.050 1.000    
InterbankRate -0.120 0.040 0.046 -0.011 0.132 -0.093 -0.056 -0.082 -0.166 1.000   








Table A3: Bounds test 
Model No. F-statistic t-statistic 
Critical values (at 5%) 
I(0) I(1) 
1 11.576   2.986     4.358 
  -6.570 -2.838   -3.979 
2 10.122   2.994     4.350 
  -6.156 -2.843   -3.986 
3 8.284   3.019     4.326 
  -5.412 -2.861   -4.006 
4 11.622   2.977     4.366 





Table A4. Other post-estimation tests 
Test Null hypothesis 
Model 




Wald test Long-run coefficients of 
independent variables are 
jointly zero 
1 0.0000   
2 0.0000   
3 0.0000   
4   0.0000   
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg 
test for heteroskedasticity 
Constant variance 1 0.3935   
2 0.3607   
3 0.9939   
4  0.5267   
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for 
autocorrelation 
No serial correlation 1 0.1902   
2 0.2918   
3 0.9165   
4 0.8693   
Durbin’s alternative test for 
autocorrelation 
No serial correlation 1 0.2502   
2 0.3521   
3 0.9284   
4 0.8890   
Skewness and kurtosis joint test 
for normality (*) 
Normality 1   0.0672 
 
  
2 0.0635   
3 0.3775   
4 0.1972   
Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal 
data 
Normality 1 0.1080   
2 0.0766   
3 0.3075   
4 0.2339   
Ramsey RESET (Regression 
Specification-Error Test) for 
omitted variables 
Model has no omitted 
variables 
1 0.5278   
2 0.3421   
3 0.7344   
4 0.5831   
Cumulative sum (CUSUM) test 
for parameter stability 
No structural break 1  0.9048 0.9479 
2  0.8857 0.9479 
3  0.4155 0.9479 
4  0.6131 0.9479 
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